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THE DISMISSAL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLTEACHERS
FOR ABERRANT BEHAVIOR
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Influence of the Teacher on the Student's Sexual
Attitudes
The public schoolteacher has traditionally been regarded
as a moral exemplar for his students.1 A cornerstone of Ameri-
can public education has been the assumption that students,
in order to become well-balanced human beings and stable
members of the community, must be taught to discern moral
values.2 According to several respected educators, the teacher
must be sensitive to the morality of his own life3 because his
behavior will often be emulated by the students in his class-
room.4 Because sexual ethics is a particularly delicate aspect
I Purifoy v. State Bd. of Educ., 106 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1973); Gover v.
Stovall, 35 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1931); See also, P. MAY, MORAL EDUCATION IN SCHOOL 10
(1971).
2 Kentucky recognized this assumption in 1946 when a committee was appointed
by the State Board of Education to explore the problem of teaching morals in the
public schools. E. HARTFORD, MORAL VALUES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: LESSONS FROM THE
KENTUCKY EXPERIENCE 42 (1958):
The first principle is a reaffirmation of the responsibility of the public school
to teach moral and spiritual values. This is a perpetual task of the school as
an agent of society. All societies develop values capable of being taught to
individuals through the work of educative agencies.
See W. BOWER, MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN EDUCATION (1952). In the introduction
to this book, Herman Lee Donovan, former President of the University of Kentucky,
envisioned a need for moral education in the actual curriculum of the public schools.
A prime purpose of all education is good character. . . . During the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, and reaching into the first decade of the
twentieth century, the curriculum of our schools was heavily loaded with
materials that emphasized moral and spiritual values. Bible readings,
Aesop's Fables, the McGuffey readers, carefully selected gems from litera-
ture which emphasized fundamental virtues-these became the core of in-
struction in reading, exerting a powerful influence on the lives of children.
But with the passing of time. . . the content of the curriculum in the public
schools was broadened, and gradually less emphasis was placed upon moral
and spiritual values. Id. at xiii.
I W. BOWER, MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN EDUCATION 88 (1952); Frankena,
Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education, 28 HARv. ED. REV. 300, 313 (1958).
Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAiv. L. REv. 1045,
1096 (1968); Frankena, Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education, 28 HARV. ED. REV.
.300 (1958); P. MAY, MORAL EDUCATION IN SCHOOL 41 (1971); Raths, Harmin & Simon,
Teaching for Value Clarity, in MORAL EDUCATION (B. CHAZAN & J. SOLTIS, eds. 1973);
B. SU;ARMAN, THE SCHOOL AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 190 (1973).
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of individual morality for children in their formative and ado-
lescent years, it seems sensible that with respect to sexual val-
ues, a public schoolteacher should be mindful of the influence
he may exert on his pupils. Empirical studies on creativity
show that students unconsciously absorb a teacher's attitudes
and beliefs,' and at least one writer has raised the possibility
that a student can absorb even a teacher's unstated moral
beliefs.' Therefore, in light of these traditional values and em-
pirical studies, it is understandable that many states partially
predicate the hiring7 and allow for the dismissal8 of public
school teachers on the basis of sexual conduct.'
Case law has always recognized a teacher's potential for
affecting a student's attitudes, and several well-established
tenets demonstrate this recognition in a concise syllogism.
First, teachers are in a position to affect the unformed sexual
values of their students.'" Second, school children are entitled
to protection by the state from teachers who would distort
those values." Third, because the development of a student's
attitudes could be affected by scandal 2 within the school com-
5 Morgan & Woerdehoff, Stability of Student Teacher Behaviors and Their Rela-
tionships to Personality and Creativity Factors, 62 J. EDUC. RES. 251 (1969); Turner &
Denny, Teacher Characteristics, Teacher Behavior, and Changes in Pupil Creativity,
69 EL.M. SCH. J. 265 (1969).
Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation and Dismissal for Sexual
Conduct. 61 CAL. L. REV. 1442, 1461 (1973).
The Kentucky statutes on teacher hirings and dismissals are illustrative. Ky.
REV. STAT. § 161.040 (1950) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
KRS § 161.120; KRS § 164.230 (University of Kentucky); KRS § 164.360 (for
state colleges and universities other than the University of Kentucky).
The scope of this discussion will be limited to sexual conduct widely classified
as violative of community mores. For cases outside the scope of sexual conduct, yet
still classified as socially reprehensible, see Williams v. School Dist. No. 40 of Gila
County, 417 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1966) (drunk and disorderly conduct); Scott v. Board of
Educ. of Alton, 156 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1959) (continued public drunkenness); Tracy v.
School Dist. No. 22, Sheridan County, Wyo., 243 P.2d 932 (Wyo. 1952); Horosko v.
School Dist. of Mount Pleasant Tp., 6 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 (1939)
(acting as waitress and part time bartender in a beer garden run by the teacher's
husband).
10 See generally Thompson v. Pendleton County Bd. of Educ., 81 S.W.2d 863 (Ky.
1935); Gover v. Stovall, 35 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1931).
" Governing Bd. of Mountain View School Dist. v. Metcalf, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724,
727 (Ct. App. 1974).
11 Board of Educ. of El Monte School Dist. v. Calderon, 110 Cal. Rptr. 916, 920-
21 (Ct. App. 1974). Here a teacher acquitted of a criminal sex offense was nevertheless
fired by a school board. The court emphasized that there was a "possible detrimental
influence" to school children, and upheld the dismissal.
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munity, the teacher must adversely affect neither faculty
members'3 nor the reputation of the school' 4 through his own
sexual conduct. Therefore, the state should be able to place
limitations on any sexual conduct of a teacher which has public
ramifications,'5 and if those limitations are breached, the
teacher should be dismissed.
It is difficult to determine whether conduct is moral.' 6 In
order for a school board's dismissal action to be valid it has
been held that there must generally be a connection between
the alleged misconduct and its harmful effect on the school
community.'" When this connection is nonexistent or virtually
invisible, school boards could dismiss a teacher without justifi-
cation.' The body of case law on the subject presents variations
on what constitutes sufficiently unusual sexual conduct by
schoolteachers to provide the connection.'9 As one judge has
stated, "Undoubtedly some school superintendents believe the
drinking of alcohol, the smoking of tobacco, or the playing of
cards is immoral; others believe it immoral to serve in the
military forces, and still others believe it immoral to refuse to
,1 Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 386-87, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 184-85
(1969); Thompson v. Pendleton County Bd. of Educ., 81 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1935).
" Brownsville Area School Dist. v. Alberts, 260 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970); But see
Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation and Dismissal for Sexual
Conduct. 61 CAL. L. REV. 1442, 1450 (1973).
1 Board of Trustees of Compton Junior College Dist. v. Stubblefield, 94 Cal. Rptr.
318, 321 (Ct. App. 1971). Here a junior college teacher was discovered by a policeman
in a parked car with a female student. Both he and the student were partially un-
dressed. After a high speed chase through the center of town, the policeman stopped
the teacher. Subsequently the teacher was dismissed for immoral conduct. The court,
in upholding the dismissal, emphasized that the integrity of school grading systems
were threatened by such teachers. The inference was that teachers would reward stu-
dents with high grades in return for extracurricular thrills. Id. at 323.
" Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665, 675 (1973)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting).
'1 See generally Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611
(5th Cir. 1975); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Acanfora v. Board of
Educ. of Montgomery County, 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
836 (1974); Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972); Morrison v. State Bd.
of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969); Erb v. Iowa State Bd. of Pub.
Instruction. 216 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1974); Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School
Dist., 233 N.E.2d 143 (C.P. Ohio 1967).
'1 Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665, 675 (1973)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting).
" See Part IV, infra.
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serve . . . [T]here is [an equally] wide divergence of views
on sexual morality.
'20
B. The Legal Issues
Because the phrase "moral conduct" is subject to diver-
gent interpretation, it is possible that statutes authorizing the
dismissal of teachers solely for "immoral conduct" may be too
vague. Because sexual activity is generally private in character,
arguably school boards and administrators have no business
intruding in the private lives of their employees. Because of
this, two constitutional issues immediately arise, either of
which could prevent a teacher from being dismissed for his
sexual activity.
The first is whether state statutes permitting dismissal of
teachers for immoral conduct are unconstitutionally vague and
hence represent denials of the right to due process given to
public school teachers by the fourteenth amendment. If found
unduly vague, a statute could be voided by a court.
The second issue is whether such statutes are unconstitu-
tional invasions of a possible right to privacy encompassing
sexual activity engaged in by the teacher. If this right to pri-
vacy encompassing sexual activity is found to exist, school
boards will have to show a "compelling state interest" 2' in order
to invade that right, and standards to justify such an interest
will have to be formulated. In the event a right to privacy is
found not to exist, these standards will be used to determine
whether a school board should dismiss a teacher for publicly
known sexual conduct, so that the decision will not be regarded
as an "arbitrary and capricious" denial of due process. 22 This
search for standards constitutes an additional issue arising
from teacher dismissal actions.
" Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665, 675 (1973)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting).
21 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Note, Application of the Constitu-
tional Privacy Right to Exclusions and Dismissals from Public Employment, 1973
DLKF L.J. 1037, 1051.
-2 Cf. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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11. VAGUENESS
A. Introduction
Statutes authorizing the dismissal of teachers for "immo-
ral conduct" are among those that have been attacked as being
unconstitutionally vague.23 The doctrine of statutory vagueness
has been deemed a "makeweight" used to place a buffer zone
of added protection at the peripheries of guaranteed constitu-
tional freedoms. 24 Vagueness claims arise out of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, for teachers will usually
argue that the unduly vague language of the statute gave them
no notice as to the kind of conduct required 25 or prohibited.
Furthermore, they will argue that such statutes, due to their
lack of specificity, allow school administrators and the judici-
ary unjust discretionary power in the application of such laws.
2
1
For example, a district court voided an Oregon statute author-
izing the dismissal of a teacher for immoral conduct 2 on the
grounds that it failed to give notice of the kind of conduct
expected, and that it allowed too much latitude for arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.
28
23 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1973); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction,
368 U.S. 278 (1961); Pordum v. Board of Regents of N.Y., 491 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1974);
Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F. 2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1974); Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822
(D. C. Cir. 1968); Kinsella v. Board of Educ. of Central School Dist. No. 7, Erie City,
378 F. Supp. 54 (W. D. N. Y. 1974); Bence v. Brier, 357 F. Supp. 231 (E. D. Wis. 1973);
Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore.
1973), af 'd 512 F. 2d 850, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); Dougherty v. Walker, 349
F. Supp. 629 (W. D. Mo. 1972); Kennedy v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Flynn v. Giarrusso, 321 F. Supp. 1295 (E. D. La. 1971); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ.,
461 P. 2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
24 Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 YAIE L.J. 437 (1921); Note,
The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. RPv. 67 (1960);
See Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A Focus on the Military, Prison
and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. REv. 855 (1974); Comment, Legislative Develop-
ments-Teacher Dismissal Legislation: The Nevada Approach, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 112
(1968); Comment, Legislation-Requirement of Definiteness in Statutory Standards,
53 MicH. L. REV. 264 (1954).
25 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Alabama Educ. Ass'n
v. Wallace, 362 F. Supp. 682, 687 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Burton v. Cascade School Dist.
Union High School No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254, 255 (D. Ore. 1973), aff'd, 512 F.2d 850,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975);. Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 80-81 (1960).
11 Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254, 255
(D. Ore. 1973), aff'd 512 F.2d 850, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
2 Id. (Ms. Burton had acknowledged that she was a "practicing homosexual.")
2m Id.
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It has been argued that it is impossible to discern legisla-
tive intent from unduly vague statutory language, so that
school administrators, judges,29 and juries attempting to apply
the statute do not know what kinds of conduct the legislature
intended to proscribe. What one legislator intended to prohibit
as immoral conduct for a schoolteacher might differ widely
from the views of another legislator sitting in the same session
and voting for the same bill. The motivations of a legislature
sitting 50 years ago authorizing the dismissal of a teacher for
immoral conduct might not be the same as those of a legisla-
ture voting on the same issue today.
B. Recent Supreme Court Treatment of Vagueness
In light of three recent Supreme Court cases0 the argu-
ments mentioned above are less persuasive. While the facts on
which these three cases were decided are unrelated to teacher
dismissal statutes, taken together the cases support the infer-
ence that statutes authorizing the dismissal of teachers for
immorality will not be declared unconstitutionally vague.
In Colten v. Kentucky,3' the plaintiff was arrested and
fined $10 under a disorderly conduct statute31 for arguing with
a state trooper and thereby congesting traffic. The Supreme
Court, holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague, stated that "the root of the vagueness doctrine is a
rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle designed to convey
into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in draw-
ing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account
a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide
fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited."
'
9 Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
RFv. 67, 80-81 (1960).
11 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); United States Civil Service Comm'n
v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Colten v. Ken-
tucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972).
3' 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
31 KRS § 437.016 (1) (f) (Supp. 1968) states:
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
(f) Congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply
with a lawful order of the police to disperse.
" 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
[Vol. 64
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Under similar reasoning, a teacher dismissal statute covering
a wide range of "immoral conduct" could not easily be drafted
to "provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are pro-
hibited."
34
United States Civil Service Commission v. National Asso-
ciation of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 3' held that § 9(a) of the
Hatch Act,3 which severely limits the right of federal employ-
ees to participate in politics, was neither an unconstitutional
abridgment of the respondent's first amendment privileges, nor
was it unconstitutionally vague. As in Colten, the Court recog-
nized the semantic problems inherent in drafting statutes and
stated that "there are limitations in the English language with
respect to being both specific and manageably brief. . .."31
In addition, the Court set out a broad standard holding that
allegedly vague statutes will not be voided if ". . . they are set
out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary com-
mon sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, with-
out sacrifice to the public interest.
'3
This standard was reiterated in a 1974 case, Arnett v.
Kennedy.39 A federal employee made recklessly false accusa-
tions and defamatory statements about several fellow employ-
ees. He was dismissed under the Lloyd-La Follette Act" which
provides for the removal of federal employees "only for such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."" The Court
held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. 42 The
facts in Arnett are similar to the situation of a teacher being
dismissed for unusual sexual activity known to the public,
under the authority of a state statute, in that both situations
31 Id.
413 U.S. 548 (1973).
5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2)(1970).
United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-
CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 (1973).
u Id.
" 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
W 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970).
Id.
12 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Although it was a plurality opinion for another reason
(whether the dismissal statute was an unconstitutional denial of due process because
it failed to provide for a preremoval hearing), six of the nine justices (Burger, C.J.,
Rehnquist, Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, White JJ.) supported the holding that the
statute was not overly vague.
19761
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involve discharged public servants. Providing administrative
agencies with wide flexibility to supervise the conduct of their
employees underlies the holding in Arnett.4" It may be inferred
that because school boards are administrative agencies, they
too should have wide flexibility in governing employee conduct.
Such flexibility allows administrative agencies to deal more
easily with unforeseen employee offenses than would a more
specific dismissal statute.4 In addition, a broad statute allows
administrators to maintain their authority through the threat
of dismissal, 5 to maintain high professional standards of con-
duct," and to regulate conduct without becoming entangled by
elaborate rules. 7 Of course, the possibility of administrative
abuse exists within the broad mandates of such a statute.
4
Arnett explicitly stated as one caveat to its holding that
where a public servant is dismissed under a conceivably vague
statute for conduct that is constitutionally protected, the stat-
ute will be held unconstitutionally vague as to the conduct at
issue but not in its entirety. Protected rights of speech and
association cannot be abridged by administrators seeking to
dismiss employees for the exercise of such rights. Because it is
unclear whether private sexual conduct between consenting
adults is protected by the Constitution," it is possible that
statutes allowing the dismissal of school teachers for "immoral
conduct" will not be declared void for vagueness in light of the
caveat in Arnett.
C. Wishart v. McDonald, an Elaboration of Arnett
A decision dealing with a teacher dismissal statute,
Wishart v. McDonald,5' followed the reasoning of Arnett. For
several weeks at night a sixth grade school teacher carried a
,3 Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A Focus on the Military,
Prison and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. REv. 855, 872 (1974).
" Id.
Is Id.
InId.
Id.
" Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 F.Supp. 254 (D.
Ore. 1973), afl'd 512 F.2d 850, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
416 U.S. 134, 163 (1974).
See Part III, infra.
500 F. 2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 64
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dressed mannequin onto his well-lit lawn. In full view of scan-
dalized neighbors, he undressed the mannequin and proceeded
to perform unnatural acts upon it. He was dismissed by the
school board for conduct unbecoming a teacher.
Undaunted, Wishart sued on the theory that his right to
privacy had been violated 2 and that the dismissal statute was
unconstitutionally vague." The First Circuit Court of Appeals
held that his claim under the vagueness doctrine was foreclosed
by Arnett v. Kennedy." Even though the statute gave no notice
as to the type of misconduct justifying dismissal, "[the con-
duct] was sufficiently odd and suggestive that the ordinary
person would know, in advance, that his image as an elemen-
tary school teacher would be gravely jeopardized. ' 5 5 Further-
more, the court implied that had Wishart undressed his man-
nequin inside his home rather than in his front yard, his con-
duct might have been protected by the constitutional right of
privacy. Because his conduct was not behind closed doors, the
statute could not be declared void for vagueness on this basis
either.
Wishart illustrates the application of the Arnett-Letter
Carrier's- Co Iten vagueness rationale to teacher dismissals for
unusual sexual activity known to the public. The standard set
up by those cases is based on conduct that the ordinary person
using ordinary common sense would consider to violate public
standards of decency. 6 Under this vagueness rationale, an
immorality statute will be declared void as a denial of due
process only when it violates a constitutionally protected right.
However, it is unclear whether the unusual sexual conduct of
a teacher will be protected within a right to privacy.
III. PRIVACY
In a seminal article co-authored while he was still in law
school, Mr. Justice Brandeis delineated a "general right to pri-
1, Id. at 1113-14.
13 Id. at 1116.
416 U.S. 134 (1974).
500 F.2d 1110, 1116 (1st Cir. 1974).
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159 (1974), quoting United States Civil Serv-
ice Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79
(1973).
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vacy ' '57 grounded in the common law, and covering "the right
to be let alone.", 8 More recently, psychologists and legal writers
interested in the psychological aspects of privacy 9 have found
it to be essential to the mental and emotional stability of the
individual. Privacy is generally recognized as a necessary con-
text in which human values such as love and freedom may
grow, and as a necessary means by which people can control
information about themselves, thus protecting their self im-
ages.6  Yet privacy, while recognized as a desirable value, has
not been made an absolute in either statutory or case law. As
Mr. Justice Rehnquist has stated in a recent article:'
"Privacy" in today's lexicon is a "good" word; that which
increases privacy is considered desirable, and that which de-
creases it is considered undesirable. It is a "positive"
value. . . . [J]ust as no thinking person is categorically
opposed to "privacy" in the abstract, it seems to me that no
careful student of the subject would suggest that the claim
of privacy ought to prevail over every other societal claim
whatever the fact situation may be."2
It is possible 3 that the right to privacy as enunciated in
Griswold v. Connecticut64 and subsequent cases65 may not be
extended to include all consensual adult sexual activity. These
cases must be examined in order to understand the lack of
clarity" that has led to contradictory decisions by courts at-
tempting to determine whether a teacher's sexual involvements
are protected by such a right to privacy.
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890).
Id. at 193.
Creech, The Privacy of Government Employees, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 413
(1966); Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 307
(1966).
Note, Privacy, 82 YALE L. J. 1462, 1466 (1973).
Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right to Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective
Lou' Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L. Rv.
1 (1974).
82 Id. at 2.
3 See Part III(A), infra.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
11 See Part III(B), infra.
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A. The Supreme Court Privacy Cases and Consensual Sexual
Conduct
In Griswold v. Connecticut,6 7 it was found that marriage
is a relationship protected by a constitutional zone of privacy,
and that a Connecticut law banning the use of contraceptives
unnecessarily interfered with that protected zone. The Court's
opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Douglas, stated that the right
to privacy was created by the penumbras of the first, third,
fourth, fifth and ninth amendments." This case made it clear
that the institution of marriage and the right of married cou-
ples to obtain contraceptives were protected within the zone of
privacy; the fact that no one joined in Mr. Justice Douglas'
opinion, and that there were three separate concurring opinions
and two dissents make any further interpretation difficult. 9
Mr. Justice Harlan authored a much quoted concurrence in
which he based the right to privacy on the substantive due
process doctrine of the fourteenth amendment. 71 Under this
interpretation a right to privacy exists if the conduct from
which the privacy claim arises is "fundamental" and "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."' 7' The grounding of a right
of privacy in the substantive due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment has been elaborated in subsequent cases.72
.7 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
' Id. at 484:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association con-
tained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one . . . .The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any
house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."
11 The concurrences were written by Goldberg, J. joined by Warren, CJ., and
Brennan, J.; Harlan, J.; and White, J. The dissents were penned by Black and Stew-
art, JJ., each joining the other.
7' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-502 (1965).
Id. at 500, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
72 Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
19761
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In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 73 the Court indicated through dic-
tum that the right to privacy, in certain circumstances, might
be extended to unmarried as well as married individuals. The
Court reversed the conviction of Baird for distributing a contra-
ceptive to an unmarried woman in violation of a Massachusetts
statute on an equal protection rather than a privacy theory.
74
It remained for Roe v. Wade 5 to crystalize the dictum of
Eisenstadt and extend the right to privacy beyond institutional
marriage to the individual. An unmarried pregnant woman
challenged the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion
statutes, and the Court held that such statutes infringed upon
a woman's private decision to end her pregnancy. Mr. Justice
Blackmun, for the majority, found such a private decision to
be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," thus using the
reasoning of the Harlan concurrence in Griswold.7" In addition,
the Court unequivocably stated that any attempt by the state
to regulate an area encompassed by the right to privacy would
have to be justified by a "compelling interest." ' In this in-
stance it was held that such an interest existed soon after the
first trimester of pregnancy because the state had an interest
in preserving the health of the mother and an interest in pre-
serving human life.79
In Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,80 the Court elaborated
upon the right to privacy, although this time an obscenity
issue was involved. The Court held that an injunction against
showing an obscene film in a theater open to the public did
not violate the prospective viewer's right to privacy. Critical
to the Court's reasoning was that no intimate relationship
such as marriage8' was involved, as was the situation in Gris-
wold, and that the film was not shown in the intimacy of a
private home.8 2 Previously, the Court had held in Stanley v.
' 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
7 Id. at 446-48.
,6 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71 Id. at 152-56.
7 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-502 (1965).
, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64.
" Id. at 163.
413 U.S. 49 (1973).
"Id. at 65.
X2 Id.
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Georgia13 that obscene film strips shown inside a home were
protected under the emerging right to privacy, and that a stat-
ute forbidding them was invalid. The Court in Paris limited the
Stanley holding to its facts, stating that all it stood for was the
proposition that "a man's home was his castle."84
In addition, the Paris Court in dictum seemed to limit the
right of privacy to the confines of the home and to certain
intimate relations as long as they occur in locations closely
associated with the nature of the relationship:
Our prior decisions recognizing a right to privacy guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment included "only personal rights
that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). This privacy
right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the
home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and
child rearing."
Clearly, the home is protected by the right to privacy, 6
and the intimately personal decisions of whether to use contra-
ceptives "7 or to obtain an abortion also fall within its confines.
It has been argued that these protections are based broadly
enough so that all consensual sexual relations are included."
This contention is based on the assumptions that all sexual
activity within the home is protected," that sex is the ultimate
personal intimacy and is protected even when conducted out-
side of the home in "locations closely associated with the na-
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
" 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
Id. at 65.
9 Id.; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
,0 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (dictum); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
K9 Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 670, 732-38 (1973); O'Neil, The Private Lives of Public Employees, 51 ORE. L.
REV. 70, 97-99 (1971).
11 Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
Charles Cotner had been prosecuted for an act of sodomy with his wife. The Court of
Appeals of the Seventh Circuit declared at page 875 that "[T]he import of the Gris-
wold decision is that private, consensual, marital relations are protected from regula-
tion by the state .... " The court thus held that a state could not constitutionally
prosecute a married person for a consensual act of sodomy with his spouse.
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ture of the relationship," 9' and that if an unmarried woman can
constitutionally use a contraceptive or have an abortion then,
implicitly, sexual activity is included in the right to privacy.2
Presently, this contention is subject to criticism. In
McLaughlin v. Florida,9" decided one year before Griswold, a
statute punishing interracial cohabitation out of wedlock was
declared unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection.
The decision, however, included the dictum that state laws
regulating sexual activity were constitutional if they did not
distinguish between races. The Court stated that "[t]hose
provisions . . . which are neutral as to race express a general
and strong state policy against promiscuous conduct ....
These provisions, if enforced, would reach illicit relations of
any kind and in this way protect the integrity of the marriage
laws of the state . . ... " This language indicates that the
Court believed states may regulate some sexual conduct to
preserve the sanctity of marriage.
Even though the privacy cases beginning with Griswold
have protected some behavior that was within the home or
within certain relationships, there was dicta in these cases indi-
cating that the holdings were not to be extended to all private
consensual sexual conduct. The Supreme Court repudiated the
argument that "one has an unlimited right to do with one's
body as one pleases" in Roe v. Wade.95 This language, coupled
with Mr. Justice Goldberg's warning in his Griswold concurr-
ence that the right of married couples to obtain contraceptives
did not interfere ". . . with a State's proper regulation of sex-
ual promiscuity or misconduct,"9 indicates that the constitu-
tional doctrine of privacy has boundaries, outside of which con-
sensual sexual behavior having public ramifications may fall.
On March 29, 1976, the Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of a three-judge district court in Doe v. Commonwealth's
11 Note, Application of the Constitutional Privacy Right to Exclusions and Dis-
missals from Public Employment, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1037, 1045 (1973).
9 See also Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual
Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613, 1618 (1974).
379 U.S. 184 (1964).
Id. at 196.
410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Attorney for City of Richmond.7 The male homosexual plain-
tiffs sought to have Virginia's sodomy law 8 declared unconsti-
tutional when it was applied to private consensual conduct.
The district court held that the statute was not an unconstitu-
tional denial of the right to privacy, and stated that preced-
ents" cited to the court rested ". . . exclusively on the precept
that the Constitution condemns State legislation that tres-
passes upon the privacy of the incidents of marriage, upon the
sanctity of the home, or upon the virtue of family life."'," The
court then stated that there was ". . . no authoritative judicial
bar to the proscription of homosexuality-since it is obviously
no portion of marriage, home or family life. . . ."' Thus the
Supreme Court in its memorandum decision upheld a lower
court decision implicitly agreeing with the dicta in previous
cases that all private consensual sexual conduct does not fall
within the right of privacy, and specifically holding that so-
domy statutes forbidding homosexual conduct between con-
senting adults are constitutional. It remains to be seen whether
other forms of sexual activity will be found to lie outside the
right to privacy.
B. Privacy and the School Teacher
The only safe statement that can be made as to whether
the private sexual conduct of a teacher is protected against
state regulation is that courts differ. Because privacy is still a
hazy constitutional principle, judges have enormous room to
"value sculpt.' ' °2 They have the power to determine whether
certain conduct is "fundamental" and "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,"'0 3 and if they find that certain conduct is
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976).
" VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-361(1975): Crimes against nature. If any person shall
carnally know in any manner any brute animal, or carnally know any male or female
person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal
knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a . . . felony.
" The cases included Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
,0 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200.
'01 Id. at 1202.
,01 Note, Application of the Constitutional Privacy Right to Exclusions and Dis-
missals from Public Employment, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1037, 1045.
103 Id.
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constitutionally protected under those standards, they still
have enormous discretion in designating state interests as
"compelling.",o4
Examination of several lower court cases indicates the ex-
tent of this latitude. In Fisher v. Snyder,01 5 a female school-
teacher was dismissed for having a male teacher, a friend and
contemporary of her son, stay overnight as a guest on several
different occasions. Evidence that a sexual involvement existed
was scanty. The court reinstated the teacher, basing its reason-
ing on the proposition that association of persons within one's
home is protected within the meaning of the right to privacy.' 5
In Acanfora v. Board of Education of Montgomery
County,'07 a court held that a teacher could not be dismissed
from his position merely on the grounds that he was a homosex-
ual. The court stated that homosexuality was an activity pro-
tected by the right to privacy, 8 but affirmed the dismissal on
other grounds.'"' Both of these cases indicate that private con-
sensual sexual conduct involving teachers falls within the zone
of privacy. Neither court considered whether the state had a
compelling interest justifying interference.
However, one court has found no privacy right to exist with
respect to teachers' sexual activity. In Jerry v. Board of Educa-
tion of City School District of Syracuse, 110 the New York Court
of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a high school guidance coun-
selor who had intercourse with an 18-year-old female student
whom he was counseling. Emphasizing that there was no abso-
lute right to privacy, the court stated:
In our view what might otherwise be considered private con-
duct beyond the scope of licit concern of school officials
ceases to be such in at least either of two circumstances-if
the conduct directly affects the performance of the profes-
sional responsibilities of the teacher, or if, without contribu-
tion on the part of school officials, the conduct has become
the subject of such public notoriety as significantly and rea-
Id. at 1046.
" 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972).
lO Id. at 400.
" 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
Id. at 851.
Id. at 856.
,10 324 N.E.2d 106, 364 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1974).
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sonably to impair the capability of the particular teacher to
discharge the responsibilities of his position."'
None of the cases mentioned above, with the exception of
Jerry, attempted to define the right to privacy as it relates to
teacher dismissal on grounds of sexual misconduct. Not one
case mentioned that sexual conduct was "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty," and neither of the cases affirming a
right to privacy examined whether there was a "compelling
state interest" in regulating the conduct. Rather, the cases
illustrate wide judicial discretion, inevitable because of the
incomplete elucidation of the problem by the Supreme Court,
in determining what conduct is and is not protected by the
right to privacy.
IV. STANDARDS USED IN DISMISSAL ACTIONS
Most courts reviewing teacher dismissals for sexual con-
duct have completely avoided the privacy issue."2 Instead, they
have formulated varying criteria for determining the degree of
conduct which justifies the dismissal of a teacher. Even if the
Supreme Court were ever to find that consensual adult sexual
behavior was protected by the Constitution, the courts' cri-
teria would still determine whether the state had a compelling
interest in dismissing teachers for engaging in conduct of wide-
spread public notoriety.
A. The Values of the Judge Determining the Outcome of the
Case
There must be a connection between the teacher's act
complained of and its alleged detrimental effect on the school
system." 3 Dismissal actions can be neither arbitrary nor
' Id. at 111.
" Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254,
255 (D. Ore. 1973), aff'd, 512 F.2d 850, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); Pettit v. State
Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973); Purifoy v. State Bd. of Educ.,
106 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1973); Comment, Pettit v. State Board of Educa-
tion-Out-of-Classroom Sexual Misconduct as Grounds for Revocation of Teaching
Credentials, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 797, 804.
"I See generally Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Mindel v.
United States Civil Service Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485, 487 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Morrison
v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969); Note, The California
Supreme Court, Pettit and Disciplinary Proceedings Against Teachers, 1 PEP. L. REv.
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capricious."' The determination of such a connection and the
requisite standards for dismissal, however, has led to disparate
results among courts, and these results rest on the values of the
judge deciding the case. Implicit in the decision will be the
judge's concepts of morality, 1 5 and whether he believes that a
teacher's allegedly immoral conduct is harmful," '" or even po-
tentially harmful, to the students,"' to other teachers,"' or to
the reputation of the school." 9
Results reached in two recent federal cases decided in the
same month are illustrative of the disparity. In Sullivan v.
Meade County Independent School District No. 101,120 a
404 (1974); Comment, Pettit v. State Bd. of Education- Our-of-Classroom Sexual
Misconduct as Grounds for Revocation of Teaching Credentials, 1973 UTAH L. REv.
797. Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation and Dismissal for Sexual
Conduct, 61 CAL. L. Rev. 1442, 1447 (1973).
'" Cf. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
I's The Kentucky case law is illustrative. In Thompson v. Pendleton County Bd.
of Educ., 81 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1935), a married principal was dismissed for making
advances toward three different women. The dismissal was upheld, even though no
proof of actual immoral conduct existed, on the grounds that the principal had not
acted with "discretion and exemplary conduct." Id. at 864.
Gover v. Stovall, 35 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1931) upheld the dismissal of a public high
school teacher and football coach who went with three young ladies into an unlit school
building at night, for approximately 45 minutes to an hour. The proof introduced at
trial showed absolutely no evidence of any sexual activity; however, the Court reasoned
at page 26 that sufficient "suspicions of immorality" existed to justify the dismissal.
Both Thompson and Gover indicate extremely protective attitudes toward Ken-
tucky school children by the Kentucky Supreme Court. See Crawford v. Lewis, 186
S.W. 492 (Ky. 1916); Bowman v. Ray, 80 S.W. 516 (Ky. 1904). The mores of the Court
may have changed somewhat with the passage of 40 years, although there is no case
law to indicate such a trend.
1,6 Jerry v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of Syracuse, 324 N.E.2d 106, 364
N.Y.S.2d 440 (1974); Board of Trustees of Compton Junior College Dist. v. Stubble-
field, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Ct. App. 1971); Denton v. South Kitsap School Dist. No. 402,
516 P.2d 1080 (Wash. 1973). Denton upheld the dismissal of a teacher who had engaged
in sexual activity with a female student, but who had married her soon thereafter.
,,7 Governing Bd. of Nicasio School Dist. of Main County v. Brennan, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 712 (Ct. App. 1971) (where a teacher was dismissed after submitting an affidavit
to a trial court in the marijuana prosecution of a friend, stating that she (the teacher)
had been smoking marijuana since 1949 almost daily with only beneficial results); In
re Grossman, 316 A.2d 39 (N.J. 1974) (where the dismissal of a teacher who underwent
a sex change operation was upheld).
"' Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 186 (1969).
,, See also Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952); Purifoy v. State Bd.
of Educ., 106 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1973).
'1 387 F. Supp. 1237 (D.S.D. 1975).
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teacher was dismissed from her job in a small South Dakota
town after a petition signed by parents and interested citizens
was submitted which demanded her dismissal because she was
living out of wedlock with her boyfriend. The federal district
court upheld the dismissal by classifying her conduct as immo-
ral and stating that "It would seem reasonable for the school
board to conclude that controversy between the plaintiff and
the parents and community members of this locale would make
it difficult for Miss Sullivan to maintain the proper educational
setting in her classroom."'' In Andrews v. Drew Municipal
Separate School District, 2 2 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that an unwed mother could not be dismissed from
her job in the public school system because it is a denial of due
process to presume that a teacher is immoral simply because
she is an unwed mother.'2 In both cases, school boards at-
tempted to dismiss the teachers because they were believed to
be immoral and therefore bad influences on the students. In
both cases, there was an alleged connection between the con-
duct complained of and its effect on the students. Yet in these
cases two entirely different results were reached. This disparity
might be explained most easily by the different value judg-
ments of the courts making the decisions.
Some judges are swayed by the notion that school boards
and administrators have the expertise necessary to ascertain
the effect of a teacher's sexual habits on public school children,
and hence are reluctant to overturn dismissal actions.' As a
result, these judges will develop less stringent standards than
will those who are more influenced by claims that school-
teachers have a right to privacy in their sexual lives, even
though the law on which such claims are based is question-
able.1' For example, courts have upheld teacher dismissals if
1, Id. at 1247..
, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975).
"2 Id. at 614-15.
"I See Williams v. School Dist. No. 40 of Gila County, 417 P.2d 376, 377 (Ariz.
1966); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 403, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 203 (1969)
(Burke, J., dissenting); Board of Educ. of City of Los Angeles v. Swan, 261 P.2d 261,
41 Cal. 2d 546 (1953); Griggs v. Board of Trustees of Merced Union High School Dist.,
32 Cal. Rptr. 355 (Ct. App. 1963); Last v. Board of Educ. of Community Unit School
Dist., 185 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ill. 1962).
' See Part III, infra.
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there is "possible impairment of teaching ability" rather than
actual impairment,2 ' if the conduct of the teacher has become
sufficiently notorious so that the teacher's effectiveness is
lessened in the school,' 7 or even in the community,"' or if the
morals of the community are affected by the conduct."9
Decisions which give school administrators wide latitude
to judge the behavior of their employees are open to criticism.
Such criticism includes the fear that school administrators can
examine the private lives of all employees to search for instan-
ces of conduct which might be considered violative of com-
munity mores, 3 ' that they can "roam at will" in their search
for such conduct13' and look for past incidences of sexual in-
volvement bearing no relation to the teacher's current fitness
to teach, that vast numbers of teachers could be dismissed, 3
2
that many potentially good teachers would be discouraged
from entering the profession 33 due to a reluctance to have their
private lives examined by school officials, that school adminis-
trators could fire any teacher with whom they disagreed in
matters totally unrelated to that teacher's conduct on the basis
of a discovery of socially disapproved conduct on that teacher's
part, 34 and that school boards do not have the ability and
I Board of Trustees of Compton Junior College Dist. v. Stubblefield, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 318, 322 (Ct. App. 1971).
Iz' See Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973); Board
of Trustees of Compton Junior College Dist. v. Stubblefield, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318, 322 (Ct.
App. 1971).
12 Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation and Dismissal for Sexual
Conduct, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1442, 1450 (1973).
in Under this view, the teacher is seen as an agent of the state charged with the
authority to teach commonly held moral principles to his students. A classic debate
between two eminent legal scholars, H. L. A. Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin, has
centered on the issue of whether societies should attempt to enforce commonly held
moral principles. See H. HART, LAW, LmERTY & MoRALITY (1963); P. DEVUN, THE
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The
Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
581 (1967).
"I See Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970
DUKE L.J. 841, 845-47.
"I Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665, 675 (1973)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting).
'2 Willemsen, Sex and the School Teacher, 14 SANTA CLARA LAw. 839, 844-46
(1974).
"I Comment, Legislative Developments-Teacher Dismissal Legislation: The
Nevada Approach, 6 HARv. J. LEGIs. 112, 122 (1968).
I" Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuKE
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critical judgment to determine what conduct is harmful to the
students. Because it is difficult for a teacher to obtain employ-
ment elsewhere after a dismissal by a school district, 135 these
criticisms are serious indeed.
Clearly, if a court upholds a dismissal action on the as-
sumption that the school administrators have enough expertise
to determine the necessity of that action, there is a possibility
of abuse in dismissal determination. In recognition of this dan-
ger, some courts and commentators have formulated standards
which attempt to make the effect of the teacher's sexual activi-
ties on his teaching performance the determinative factor in
dismissal proceedings. These standards still give the judiciary
wide discretion in upholding a dismissal.
B. Standards of Dismissal
The factors used to decide if a teacher should be dismissed
for sexual conduct vary widely from state to state and from
community to community. What might be considered repre-
hensible conduct in one city or geographical region might not
be considered such in another locality. This geographical factor
may be one way to explain the wide disparity in dismissal
actions. The assumption is that a wider range of sexual behav-
ior will be tolerated by school boards in a cosmopolitan area
than more provincial localities would allow. A more fundamen-
tal reason, however, is that there is no uniformly consistent
view of morality in America today. A Victorian ethos with stan-
dards of moral conduct relatively fixed no longer pervades this
society. However, determinative factors in making dismissal
decisions which can be culled from the case law are the status
of the parties involved, the proximity or remoteness in time of
the misconduct in question, the degree of notoriety which the
misconduct has attained, its likelihood of repetition, and the
nature of the offense.
1. Status of the Participants in the Sexual Activity
Courts will pay close attention to the status of the persons
L.J. 841, 845-47.
"' See Frakt, Non-Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 27,
35 (1969).
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involved in the sexual activity.36 Invariably, teacher dismissals
for becoming sexually involved with a student,3 ' even when the
student is not taught by the teacher, 3 have been held valid.
On the other hand, when the activity is with other teachers, 3
or with adults outside the school community, 4 ' dismissals have
not inevitably been upheld.
One factor related to status is the age level of the students
who are taught by the teacher. 4' If they are in elementary,
junior high, or even senior high school, they are arguably more
in need of protection than are students in college' because
they are more impressionable. As one commentator has stated,
".. . [Alt some point, perhaps at the high school or univer-
sity level, the private activities of the teacher should become
almost wholly irrelevant, as long as they do not impinge on
classroom behavior or directly affect the students."'4
Another status-related factor is the subject which is taught
by the schoolteacher. Some teachers, because of the type of
subject they teach, will have limited effect on a student's val-
ues, and, as a result, sexual conduct by those teachers may not
merit dismissal.'44 For example, a mechanical drawing, shop,
or typing teacher will have much less influence over the moral
values of a student than would an athletic coach or a humani-
ties instructor.
"I Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 386-87, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 186-87
(1969).
"' Jerry v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of Syracuse, 324 N.E.2d 106, 364
N.Y.S.2d 440 (1974); Board of Trustees of Compton Junior College Dist. v. Stubble-
field, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Ct. App. 1971); Denton v. South Kitsap School Dist. No. 402,
516 P.2d 1080 (Wash. 1973).
' Denton v. South Kitsap School Dist. No. 402, 516 P.2d 1080 (Wash. 1973).
rn Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
, Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973).
" The use of expert psychological testimony at the trial should be introduced in
order to ascertain the effect of the conduct in relation to the age level of the students
taught.
"I But see Board of Trustees of Compton Junior College Dist. v. Stubblefield, 94
Cal. Rptr. 318 (Ct. App. 1971).
"I Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 1045, 1097
(1968).
I" Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 898, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665, 674 (1973);
Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation and Dismissal for Sexual
Conduct, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1442, 1451 (1973).
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2. Proximity in Time
The period of time which has lapsed between the conduct
and the time of the dismissal action is also an important ele-
ment for a school board deciding whether to dismiss a teacher,
as well as a judge deciding whether to uphold that dismissal.
If the conduct were an isolated occurrence several years earlier,
it is less likely' 5 that a court would uphold the dismissal than
if the conduct occurred only months previously. The rationale
is that school boards should not be able to dredge up indiscre-
tions from years past to dismiss a teacher.
3. Likelihood of Repetition
Courts are interested in the likelihood that the conduct
will recur. 4 ' The rationale behind this factor, once again, is the
protection of students and faculty members. Two determina-
tive factors used in deciding the probability of repetition are
the number of times the conduct has occurred'47 and the length
of time over which the conduct has extended."' Furthermore,
courts will give great weight to psychiatric or psychological
testimony as to whether the conduct is likely to be repeated.4
4. Degree of Notoriety
The fourth factor examined in a teacher dismissal action
is the degree of notoriety which the teacher's conduct has at-
tained. "1' In one case involving the dismissal of a homosexual
teacher, the court held that homosexuality was not sufficient
grounds to dismiss a teacher, but because the teacher had at-
" Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973) (3
years-dismissal upheld); But see Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 82
Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969) (3 years-dismissal reversed).
' Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 186 (1969).
" Id. at 391.
I'Id.
"' See e.g., Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 1112 (1st Cir. 1974); Morrison
v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 391, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 191 (1969):
The board called no medical, psychological, or psychiatric experts to testify
as to whether a man who had had a single isolated, and limited homosexual
contact would be likely to repeat such conduct in the future.
I" See Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App.
1971); Board of Trustees of Compton Junior College Dist. v. Stubblefield, 94 Cal. Rptr.
318, 322 (Ct. App. 1971).
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tracted widespread public attention to his sexual preference by
a number of -local and national television and radio shows, his
conduct had attained a degree of notoriety sufficient to warrant
his dismissal.'
5 '
The underlying rationale in examining the notoriety of the
conduct is that the teacher's effectiveness in the classroom
would be impaired if the community reacted negatively to the
conduct. Retention of the teacher could provoke community
disapproval of the school system. Such community disapproval
could cause pupils to lose their respect for that teacher and
their desire to learn from him or her. In summarizing the effect
of a teacher's notoriety, a recent article has stated:
Co-workers might become resentful or antagonistic, thus
making administrative and collegial relations unproductive.
Parents might lose faith in the school system. Voters might
reject school bonds necessary to supply critically needed
funding. Moreover, it can be argued that refusal to honor
community or parental sentiments by dismissal of the offend-
ing teacher can lead to an erosion of trust and support for the
educational system, in turn adversely affecting the learning
process in the schools.'52
5. Nature of the Offense
Where a teacher has been convicted of a criminal of-
fense, 55 or where criminal charges are pending, ' it is probable
that he will be dismissed and that his dismissal will be upheld
by the reviewing court. If the conduct is non-criminal, the val-
ues of the school administrators and those of the judges review-
ing the dismissal decision will prevail.
"I Acanfora v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
"2 Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation and Dismissal for Sexual
Conduct, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1442, 1450 (1973).
,"3 See Moore v. Knowles, 333 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (statutory rape);
Board of Educ. of El Monte School Dist. v. Calderon, 110 Cal. Rptr. 916 (Ct. App.
1974) (homosexual offense); Governing Bd. of Mountain View School Dist. v. Metcalf,
111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Ct. App. 1974) (homosexual offense); Comings v. State Bd. of
Educ., 100 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1972) (conviction for possession of marijuana).
"I Ha'nkla v. Governing Bd. of Roseland School Dist., 120 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Ct. App.
1975).
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COMMENTS
V. CONCLUSION
Teachers occupy a sensitive position in society. They teach
impressionable children who have yet to form their own moral
values. Teachers should be, and are, held to a higher standard
of conduct than are other governmental employees, '55 because
they are close to young people. For this reason, school authori-
ties should have wide flexibility in determining what conduct
merits dismissal.
In light of Arnett v. Kennedy, 56 it is reasonable to assume
that statutes allowing dismissal of teachers on grounds of suffi-
ciently unusual sexual conduct will not be found unconstitu-
tionally vague. Statutory language can be drafted in broad
terms to include a wide range of sexual conduct. As a result,
school boards have enormous discretion in determining what
kinds of sexual conduct to proscribe.
It is doubtful that a teacher will have a protected right of
privacy to engage in sexual conduct in all circumstances. If in
the future courts decide that all sexual conduct is protected,
states could still attempt to show a compelling state interest
to infringe that right in order to protect school students. If
courts decide that all sexual conduct is not enveloped in a zone
of privacy, school officials will be able to dismiss teachers for
such conduct as long as such dismissals are neither arbitrary
nor capricious.
57
To prevent a dismissal action from being arbitrary and
capricious, school officials bringing the action and judges re-
viewing the dismissals will look to a multiplicity of factors.
These include the status of the participants involved in the
sexual activity, the proximity or remoteness in time of the
misconduct, the degree of notoriety which the misconduct has
attained, its likelihood of repetition, and the nature of the of-
fense. These factors will provide some degree of protection to
,1 See generally Emerson & Haber, Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member
as Citizen, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 525 (1963); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional
Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841.
" 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
'' Cf. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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school teachers, but will leave a wide range of flexibility for
school officials charged with the responsibility of protecting
impressionable young people.
Richard H. C. Clay
